How it is structured
The NCSC describes the CAF as being made up of 4 high-level objectives and 14 principles, written as outcomes: a statement of what needs to be achieved rather than a checklist of what needs to be done. Beneath the principles sit 41 contributing outcomes, which are the basis of individual assessments, and each contributing outcome has a table of indicators of good practice (IGPs). NCSC lists version 4.0 of the framework, and its changelog records the release in August 2025.
The four objectives and their principles are:
- A. Managing security risk: governance, risk management, asset management, supply chain
- B. Protecting against cyber attack: service protection policies, processes and procedures; identity and access control; data security; system security; resilient networks and systems; staff awareness and training
- C. Detecting cyber security events: security monitoring, threat hunting
- D. Minimising the impact of cyber security incidents: response and recovery planning, lessons learned
NCSC says each contributing outcome is rated “achieved”, “not achieved” or, where the table provides for it, “partially achieved”. It also says IGPs are there to inform expert judgement and are not a checklist for an inflexible assessment. The NCSC blog on version 4.0 names four themes of change: a new section on understanding attackers, a new section on software security, updates to security monitoring and threat hunting, and broader coverage of AI-related cyber risk.
Which of your clients it applies to
NCSC says the CAF is used across sectors currently regulated under NIS and wider critical national infrastructure, in government, and in other sectors where operational resilience is essential. Its blog adds that the framework is primarily designed for critical national infrastructure organisations running essential services, such as energy, healthcare, transport, digital infrastructure and government, and that it is used by nearly all UK cyber regulators.
The NCSC itself says it has no regulatory responsibilities, and that organisations subject to cyber regulation should ask their regulators whether they should use the CAF. The NCSC pages we reviewed do not describe the CAF as a legal requirement, so this guide does not either. The legal duty sits elsewhere: regulation 10 of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (the NIS Regulations 2018) says an operator of essential services must take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage risks to the security of the systems its essential service relies on. The CAF is one way regulators and operators assess how well that is being done.
For an MSP, the first question is therefore which regulator, if any, a client answers to. A client that is an operator of essential services, or a supplier to one, may be asked CAF-based questions. A client outside those groups can still use the CAF voluntarily, because NCSC says any organisation wanting an outcomes-based approach to cyber risk may use it.
How an MSP delivers it
This sequence is practitioner guidance for an MSP, not an NCSC procedure.
- Confirm why the client is asking. Is a regulator, a tender, a parent organisation or the client’s own board driving it? If a regulator is involved, ask which CAF version and which profile it expects.
- Agree the scope in writing. Name the essential function and the networks and information systems it depends on, so the evidence and the later assessment cover the same boundary.
- Gather evidence principle by principle. Use the checklist below to ask the right questions and collect the right documents.
- Rate each contributing outcome. Use the NCSC indicators of good practice to inform expert judgement as achieved, partially achieved or not achieved, and record the reasoning.
- Compare with the target. NCSC says oversight bodies set target levels, often through CAF profiles. Show the gap between the client’s current ratings and the target it has been given.
- Plan the improvements. Turn each gap into an owned action with a date, and keep the log.
- Decide who assesses. NCSC says assessments can be self-assessments or independent ones by a regulator, a body acting for a regulator, or an NCSC assured commercial service provider. Check which the client needs.
Requirements checklist
The first column lists the 14 principles named on the NCSC objective pages. The second and third columns are working examples for an MSP and are not NCSC text; the CAF’s own indicators of good practice are in NCSC’s guidance for each contributing outcome.
| Principle | Question to ask the client | Evidence an assessor may ask to see |
|---|---|---|
| A1 Governance | Who is accountable for cyber risk to the essential function? | Named board owner, roles, reporting lines |
| A2 Risk management | How are risks to the function identified and who accepts them? | Risk register, treatment decisions |
| A3 Asset management | Do you know every system the function depends on? | Asset inventory, dependency map |
| A4 Supply chain | Which suppliers can affect the function, and how are they assured? | Supplier list, contract security terms |
| B1 Service protection policies, processes and procedures | Are security policies current and followed? | Approved policies, review records |
| B2 Identity and access control | Who can reach critical systems and how is that checked? | Access reviews, privileged account records |
| B3 Data security | How is data protected in storage and in transit? | Data handling rules, encryption records |
| B4 System security | How are systems kept secure and up to date? | Patching records, configuration baselines |
| B5 Resilient networks and systems | Can the function keep running if a component fails? | Architecture diagrams, backup and failover tests |
| B6 Staff awareness and training | Do staff know their security duties? | Training records, awareness material |
| C1 Security monitoring | What is monitored and who reviews the alerts? | Monitoring scope, alert handling records |
| C2 Threat hunting | Does anyone look for threats that alerts miss? | Hunt plans, findings, follow-up actions |
| D1 Response and recovery planning | Is there a tested incident plan? | Incident plan, exercise reports |
| D2 Lessons learned | What changed after the last incident or exercise? | Post-incident reviews, action logs |
Overlap with other frameworks
NCSC’s CAF pages that we reviewed do not publish a mapping to Cyber Essentials or ISO/IEC 27001, so this guide cites no official crosswalk. They do say the CAF is not a certification scheme and that achieving a CAF profile should not be presented as evidence of NCSC certification or endorsement, which separates it from certification routes such as Cyber Essentials and ISO 27001.
NCSC does point to how the CAF sits with UK law and policy. Its blog says the framework helps organisations meet legal and regulatory requirements such as the NIS Regulations, and that it is established in the public sector through GovAssure. For MSPs, the UK’s proposed Cyber Security and Resilience Bill would bring medium and large managed service providers into scope of the NIS Regulations; our Cyber Security and Resilience Bill guide covers what is proposed. The EU’s NIS2 is a separate framework, and we have not cited an official comparison between it and the CAF. The frameworks list shows the others, and how control mapping works explains how overlapping controls are handled in practice.
Common mistakes
- Confusing the two CAFs. The Common Assessment Framework in children’s services is unrelated. A client that searches for “CAF assessment” may mean either, so confirm which one before quoting.
- Treating it as a checklist. NCSC says the IGPs inform expert judgement and are not a checklist for an inflexible process. Ratings need a written reason.
- Assuming the client must use it. NCSC has no regulatory role. Ask the client’s regulator whether the CAF applies and which version and profile it expects.
- Calling it a certificate. NCSC says it is not a certification scheme and that results should not be presented as NCSC certification or endorsement. Say which CAF version and profile an assessment used when you report outcomes.
- Scoping too widely or too narrowly. The CAF assesses essential functions. Agree which functions and systems are in scope before gathering evidence.